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skiers are still relatively new in the law. We may, however, expect
to see more litigation in this field commensurate with the growing
popularity of the sport, especially in Colorado where skiing is a
major tourist attraction.
RichardM. Kennedy
TORTS

-

WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

-

INJURY ARISING

OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT. -Finn

OUT

v. Industrial

Commission of Colorado, 437 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1968).
The claimant, John B. Finn, was seen by his supervisor shortly
after reporting to work at his place of employment, the Adolph
Coors Company. Minutes later he was found lying on the floor
nearby in a semiconscious and contorted condition. Cursory examination revealed that blood was running from his ears, his eyes were
blackened, he had facial abrasions, and his forearms were badly
bruised. It developed that the claimant had also sustained a skull
fracture. Finn's work clothes were torn and showed evidence of an
external force, and he later surmised that he had been struck by a
forklift truck. However, he was unable to produce any witnesses to
the purported accident or any direct evidence as to the exact nature
of the event which caused his injuries. The referee determined that,
although Finn had been injured while at work, he had failed to prove
that his injury arose out of his employment. At the Industrial Commission hearing, evidence of the claimant's perfect health prior to
the injury was excluded. Expert medical testimony tended to eliminate the possibilities of latent disease, seizure, or heart attack, and
there was no clinical or observable evidence of any such endogenous
condition. The Industrial Commission concurred in and adopted the
referee's findings and denied the claimant compensation based on
the belief that "this otherwise healthy man may have contorted
himself into these injuries from some innerbody malfunction."'
The district court upheld the ruling, and on appeal, the Colorado
Supreme Court, held, affirmed. There is no rebuttable presumption
in Colorado in favor of an injured employee to the effect that, in the
absence of any proof of the event causing his injury, the accident will
be held to have arisen in the course of his employment and thus
compensable under the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act.
Furthermore, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine or some variation thereof
does not apply to such an unwitnessed accident.'
1 Hearing of Finn v. Adolph Coors Co. & Liberty AMut. Ins. Co. before the Industrial

Comm'n of Colo., #1-803-503

(1964).

2 Finn v. Industrial Comm'n, 437 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1968).
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I.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW IN COLORADO

In every employment accident case, the Industrial Commission
and the courts must reach a decision as to whether a claimant's
injury did in fact "arise out of and in the course of" employment
as prescribed by statute.3 In sustaining his burden of proof, the
claimant must show by sufficient, substantial, and admissible evidence that an accident occurred within the scope of employment;4
thus, compensation cannot be awarded on the basis of speculation,
conjecture, or mere possibility.5 This seemingly innocuous requirement often becomes an insurmountable obstacle in unwitnessed
accident cases which result in the injury or death of a workman.
As stated in Industrial Commission v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co.: "There is nothing in the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act which creates a statutory presumption of accident .
6
A. Prima Facie Requirements
The elements of proof that must be established in order to
make out a prima facie case for compensation in an industrial
accident are (1) that the accident occurred at the time and place of
employment and (2) that the event was the proximate cause of
the injury.7 In unwitnessed accident cases, the essential issue is the
kind of evidence necessary to establish that (1) an event did in
fact occur, (2) the event caused the injury, and (3) the event was
related to the employment.' It is within the exclusive province of
the Industrial Commission to make these findings of fact. The func3

Workmen's Compensation Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-13-2 (1963):
Conditions of recovery. - (1) ....
(c) Where, at the time of the accident, the employee is performing
service arising out of and in the course of his employment;
(d) Where the injury or death is proximately caused by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment, and is not intentionally
self-inflicted.
See Industrial Comm'n v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 135 Colo. 372, 376, 311
P.2d 705, 707 (1957): "An accident 'arising out of the employment' . .. involves
the idea of causal relationship between the employment and the injury. The term
'in the course of' relates more particularly to the time, place and circumstances under
which the injury occurred."
4 Hamilton v. Industrial Comm'n, 132 Colo. 408, 289 P.2d 639 (1955); Industrial
Comm'n v. Strome, 107 Colo. 54, 108 P.2d 865 (1940) ; Rocky Mountain Fuel Co.
v. Kruzic, 94 Colo. 398, 30 P.2d 868 (1934) ; Lallier Constr. & Eng'r Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Colo. 593, 17 P.2d 532 (1932) ; Olson-Hall v. Industrial Comm'n,
71 Colo. 228, 205 P. 527 (1922).
5Deines Bros., Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 125 Colo. 258, 242 P.2d 600 (1952) ; United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 122 Colo. 31, 219 P.2d 315 (1950) ;
Arvas v. McNeil Coal Corp., 119 Colo. 289, 203 P.2d 906 (1949); Resler Truck
Line v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Colo. 287, 156 P.2d 132 (1945) ; Coors Porcelain Co.
v. Grenfell, 109 Colo. 39, 121 P.2d 669 (1942).
6135 Colo. 372, 376, 311 P.2d 705, 707 (1957).
7 Industrial Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698 (1957).
8
See Finn v. Industrial Comm'n, 437 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1968) (by implication). The
court found that the claimant proved only that something happened to him during
his employment.
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tion of the court on appeal is only to determine whether the evidence
submitted was substantial and if it supported the Commission's findings. "If there is any evidence, whether direct or by reasonable inference, which will support the finding and award of the Commission,
a reviewing court has no power to disturb it."'
The court therefore has severely limited discretion in examining
the facts and drawing inferences therefrom. However, it will not be
bound by findings of fact which it concludes are based on conjecture.' ° In reviewing the evidence, the court must rely on such phrases
as proper evidence, substantial evidence, direct or reasonable inference, rational mind, and conjecture. All this comes perilously close
to sheer word play. Such phrases "have little fixed meaning in themselves, and are probably more often statements of a conclusion than
workable guides toward the conclusion.""
In Industrial Commission v. Havens," the claimant suffered a
heart attack shortly after being struck by a loaded handcar. The
nature of the accident was clear, but the issue was whether the
accident was the proximate cause of the heart attack."3 The court
stated as a necessary corollary for the guidance of the Commission
that awards cannot be denied either as the result of speculation or
conjecture or upon evidence not in the record. It is obvious that the
finding of the referee in the Finn case is in conflict with this corol4
lary.1
The case most similar to Finn on its facts is Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission.'5 There the
claimant was found injured in an unwitnessed accident. He died
having related only to a fellow employee that he had slipped on
some ice. The court reaffirmed the Havens corollary disallowing a
presumption against the claimant and stated: "If this were not so, an
unattended injury or death in many cases would not be compensated."'"
The apparent inconsistencies in the Colorado Supreme Court
decisions concerning causation in workmen's compensation cases are
9
University of Denver v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 399, 257 P.2d 423, 430 (1953).
10 Cases cited note 5 supra.
112 A. LARSON, LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 80.31, at 321-22 (1961).
12 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698 (1957).
13 The referee made a finding of overexertion, but also found that overexertion does
not cause heart attacks, since just as many people die from heart attacks suffered in
their sleep as from those that occur during exertion.
14 Hearing of Finn v. Adolph Coors Co. & Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. before the Industrial
Comm'n of Colo., #1-803-503, at 2 (1964): "[l]t would appear that this otherwise
healthy man may have contorted himself into these injuries from some mysterious
inner-body malfunction." (emphasis added).
15 145 Colo. 91, 357 P.2d 929 (1960).
161d. at 96, 357 P.2d at 931.
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traceable to the court's reluctance to overrule the findings of fact by
the Commission. 1 7 Finn is orthodox for this proposition.
B. Inconsistent Criteria
In Colorado, the criteria for proof of causation in disease cases
are inconsistent with the legal requirements in unwitnessed accident
cases. There are a number of instances of claims arising out of
diseases where the claimant has been granted compensation without
medical proof of the etiological relation to the injury. 8 Perhaps the
most significant case is IndustrialCommission v. Corwin Hospital,9
which has been construed to hold that medical proof of causation
is not necessary.2 ° This decision was extended in City & County of
Denver v. Pollard21 to compensate a public health nurse who had
contracted a streptococcal infection. No medical proof was required
by the court, despite the fact that the etiological agent involved could
have been traced2 2 and that the infection could have been either
endogenous or contracted elsewhere. 2' Definitive proof was available
in the Pollard case, but the court did not require it. Yet, in Finn's
17 The

following table indicates the percentage of Industrial Commission awards upheld
on appeal by the Colorado Supreme Court. Interview with Peter L. Dye, Assistant
Attorney General for Colorado, in Denver, July 25, 1968.
Year

Total
Awards Awards
Percentof
Affirmed Reversed age of
Cases
Awards
Tried
Upheld

1951
1952

11
10

9
7

2
3

1953

18

11

1954

6

6

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959

5
12
16
8
9

4
8
10
5
4

Year

Total
Awards Awards
of
Affirmed Reversed
Gases
Tried

82%
70%

1960
1961

10
21

6
17

7

61%

1962

18

0

100%

1963

28

1
4
6
3
5

80%
67%
63%
63%
44%

1964
1965
1966
1967
*1968

10
8
22
18
23

Percentage of
Awards
Upheld

4
4

60%
81%

14

4

78%

17

11

61%

9
6
18
10
15

1
2
4
8
8

90%
75%
82%
56%
65%

* Supplementary interview with Peter L. Dye, February 17, 1969.

' 8 Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 152 Colo. 25, 380 P.2d 28 (1963);
Southern Colo. Power Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 118 Colo. 186, 193 P.2d 885 (1948);
Industrial Comm'n v. Swanson, 93 Colo. 354, 26 P.2d 107 (1933); Columbine
Laundry Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Colo. 397, 215 P. 870 (1923) ; Canon Reliance
Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 72 Colo. 477, 211 P. 868 (1923).
19 126 Colo. 358, 250 P.2d 135 (1952).
2Industrial Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 119, 314 P.2d 698, 702 (1957):
In Industrial Commission, et. al. v. Corwin Hospital . .. this court in effect
held that no medical proof of causation was necessary to prove that the
claimant contracted polio while at work, and we now add that if the rule
were otherwise an unattended injury or death in many cases could never be
compensated.
21 160 Colo. 306, 417 P.2d 231 (1966).
22

ZINSSER, MICROBIOLOGY 416-26 (13th ed. D. Smith, N. Conant, J. Overman, et al.
ed. 1964).
"[Ilt has been long known that 8 to 10% of apparently normal individuals carry
hemolytic streptococci in their throats; under conditions of crowding, especially in the
winter months, the percentage of normal carriers may be increased to 75%." Id. at
423-24. In Pollard, the claimant's infection was in mid-November.
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unwitnessed accident, where he had neither recollection nor knowledge of what had happened, and where no proof was possible, the
court refused any presumption in his favor and barred recovery. 4
II.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE

Finn DECISION

Workmen's compensation acts developed as an answer to a
highly technical and complicated society in which the individual
workman had become merely a pawn in the industrial economy. The
general principle underlying workmen's compensation is that of
spreading the risk.25 In effectuating the intent of the legislature, the
dilemma involved in unwitnessed accident cases is to what extent
the court should go in assisting the claimant in sustaining his burden
of proof. It is in this context that Finn must be reviewed.
Judicial precedent has defined legislative intent by the insertion
of common law rules of evidence and procedure. "The early courts
construed the acts with caution and erroneously inserted into workmen's compensation cases inapplicable common-law doctrines in
disguised garb.''26 The Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act abrogates the employer's common law defenses of assumption of risk
and negligence of the injured employee or his fellow servant," but
nowhere does the Act limit the employee's utilization of common law
doctrines of evidence and procedure. Nevertheless, in the Finn case,
the court emphatically stated that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or
some variation of it does not apply. The inconsistency is apparent.
On the one hand, the common law principle of placing the burden of
proof on the claimant is insisted upon, while on the other, the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is denied.2 8
Moreover, the Colorado Work-men's Compensation Act provides
that acceptance by the employee of workmen's compensation bars
recovery at common law. 29 But if an employee gives up all common
law remedies for injuries arising out of his employment, does he also
A gambit which is employed by many attorneys in attempting to establish proof of
causation in unwitnessed accident cases could be termed "negative evidence." Such
evidence is designed to eliminate all possibilities inherent to the injury except the one
the claimant is attempting to establish. However, the court has generally held that
negative evidence will not suffice to prove the accident and that the event itself must
be proved. Deines Bros., Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 125 Colo. 258, 242 P.2d 600
(1952).
25 See generally Horovitz, Workmen's Compensation: Half Century of JudicialDevelopments, 41 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1961).
24

26Id. at 99.
27 Workmen's Compensation Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-31-1 (1963).

28 The court in Finn also stated that CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-3-2 (1963) abolishes
all common law rights and remedies of the claimant in this type of case except
as provided in the Act. 437 P.2d at 543. However, § 81-3-2 actually concerns only
the liability of the employer; it states nothing whatsoever about either the rights or
remedies of the employee.
29
Workmen's Compensation Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-4-4 (1963).
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give up all common law remedies for those injuries which the
supreme court decides do not arise out of his employment? The
court held that Finn's claim for compensation was denied because
he had failed to prove that his injury arose out of his employment.
Should he therefore be barred from recovery at common law where
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would provide him with the presumption he needs? More significantly, ignoring any possible consequences of the statute of limitations, does not such a ruling indirectly
permit the case to be reopened under negligence procedures? In a
case involving the reverse proposition, the court held that an injured
employee who sued at common law did not prejudice his claim
under workmen's compensation and that the judgment obtained at
3
common law was not res judicata .
The definition of "accident" within the Colorado Workmen's
Compensation Act has been an elusive concept which has been the
focus of much legislative and judicial attention. Prior to the 1963
legislative definition, injuries were designated "accidents" to dis3
tinguish them from intentional injuries or injuries caused by disease. 1
The claimant did not have to prove that anything extraordinary
occurred in or about the work itself, such as a sudden slipping or
falling. He had only to prove that the harm had been unexpected
and unintended. 32 Thus the court in Industrial Commission v. Royal
Indemnity Co. stated: "If the evidence, and the logical inferences
therefrom, can be said to warrant a conclusion that the accident,
within a reasonable probability, resulted in the disability, the claimant
3
is entitled to compensation .
In 1963, the term "accident" was strictly defined by statute to
include "one or more determinate act or acts of a traumatic nature,
which caused an injury."134 Claimant Finn was held to a strict interpretation of the 1963 definition. Thus, he was required to prove by
definitive evidence the event which caused his injury, an ironic
requirement when judicial interpretation of the 1963 definition is
examined.
Shortly after the legislature enacted the statutory definition,
the Industrial Commission of Colorado and the State Compensation
Insurance Fund litigated two cases before the supreme court.3 These
actions were based upon the premise that the statutory definition
30

Varsity Amusement Co. v. Butters, 155 Colo. 330, 339, 394 P.2d 603, 607 (1964).
Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 84 Colo 481, 490, 271 P.2d 617, 621
(1928).
32
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Faulk, 158 Colo. 441, 407 P.2d 348 (1965); Carroll v.
Industrial Comm'n, 69 Colo. 473, 195 P. 1097 (1920).
33 124 Colo. 210, 214, 236 P.2d 293, 295-96 (1951).
3 Workmen's Compensation Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-2-9 (1963).
35
Industrial Comm'n v. Milka, 159 Colo. 114, 410 P.2d 181 (1966) ; Plummer v. State
Compensation Ins. Fund, 159 Colo. 122, 410 P.2d 185 (1966).
31
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had overruled the caselaw construing "accident," and the court should
therefore reverse awards made to the claimants. In the Milka case,
the Commission contended that proof of "some demonstrative external violence ...visited upon the body 'causing a wounding, breaking, tearing, puncturing or disruption of the continuity of the body
of the injured employee or his bodily tissue'
was the statutory
requirement. The court rejected this theory at the time and held that
this amendment merely provided for the first time a legislative
definition of the term "accident" and "did not overrule ... former
decisions." 7 This thesis is clearly discredited by the Finn decision.
The Colorado legislature in 1965 supplanted the 1963 definition
of "accident" with a new definition. 38 The 1965 statute is similar
in its requirements to the situation prior to 1963 in that it does not
contain the rigid requirement of evidence to establish determinate
acts. The 1965 definition requires only "the effect of an unknown
cause.....o It is submitted that effect in this sense means result,
something that is produced by an agent or cause. The effect is the
result, the result being the injury sustained by the claimant. Since the
cause may be unknown, the event producing the injury need not be
proved by definitive evidence. The resulting injury and the circumstances surrounding it may properly establish an "accident" and
grounds for a workmen's compensation claim.
It could be argued that the Finn case can be reopened as a
result of the revision of the "accident" definition. The Colorado
statute 40 provides for the reopening of a case on the ground of error,
mistake, or change in condition, and "mistake" has been held to
irclude mistakes of fact and law. 4 ' Theoretically, then, legislative
alteration of statutes, such as the clarification of the "accident"
definition, could be the basis for reopening and rehearing the Finn
case on this issue. Practically, however, such an attempt would
presumably fail on the basis of a prior Colorado Supreme Court
decision viewing the reopening statute as being permissive and, as
",31

36

Industrial Comm'n v. Milka, 159 Colo. 114, 118, 410 P.2d 181, 183 (1966).
"the language of an amendment
must be construed in the light of previous decisions by courts of last resort construing
the original act .... " Id. at 120, 410 P.2d at 184. Plummer v. State Compensation
Ins. Fund, 159 Colo. 122, 410 P.2d 185 (1966) was decided along with Milka, and
the court, in a terse opinion, reversed a grant of compensation on the basis of the
Milka rationale.
38
Workmen's Compensation Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-2-9 (Supp. 1965).
391d.
Definitions. - (1) The term "accident", as used in this chapter, shall
mean an unforeseen event, occurring without the will or design of the person
whose mere act causes it; an unexpected, unusual, or undesigned occurrence; or the effect of an unknown cause, or, the cause being known, an
unprecedented consequence of it.
40
Workmen's Compensation Act, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 81-14-19 (1963).
41 Gregorich v. Industrial Comm'n, 117 Colo. 423, 188 P.2d 886 (1947); Industrial
Comnn'n v. Lockard, 89 Colo. 428, 3 P.2d 416 (1931).
37id. at 121, 410 P.2d at 184. The court held that
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such, permitting but not requiring the Commission to reopen a case
upon the stipulated grounds. 42 In addition, the supreme court has
ruled that a previous alteration in the statutory definition of "accident" by the legislature did not announce any change in the law,4"
thus indicating that the court would not now require the Commission
to reopen the Finn case as a result of the latest statutory alteration
of the same term.
III. SUGGESTION - REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
Courts in Colorado and in other states have been wrestling with
the problem of whether injuries which occur from unknown causes
and without witnesses are to be compensated. There has been a
definite trend not to limit the scope of workmen's compensation
but to fulfill the purpose of the act, which is highly remedial and
which "must be given a liberal construction to accomplish its bene' 44
ficial purposes.
Recent events in other jurisdictions indicate that the trend in
workmen's compensation procedure, both by statute4 5 and by judicial
precedent,4" is to create a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
claimant. In Colorado, the Havens corollary implies such a presumption, but the burden of proof is still on the claimant as at common
law. The Colorado statute outlines the burden of proof requirement
only in the section on occupational diseases.4 7 Consequently, the
omission of any reference to burden of proof elsewhere in the act
would lead to the conclusion that a presumption in favor of the
claimant was intended.
There is no inherent human right to recovery for any and all
injuries sustained during the hours of employment. It is incumbent
upon the legislature, the courts, and the Industrial Commission to
42

Industrial Comm'n v. Cutshall, 433 P.2d 765 (Colo. 1967).

4

See note 36 supra and accompanying text.

44 Industrial Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 119, 314 P.2d 698, 702 (1957).
4See, e.g., N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 21 (McKinney 1965):

In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under
this chapter, it shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to
the contrary
1. That the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter;
3. That the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the
injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another.
4
6See, e.g., Steele v. Adler, 269 F. Supp. 376 (D.D.C. 1967); Foust v. Birds Eye
Div. of General Foods Corp., 91 Idaho 418, 422 P.2d 616 (1967) ; Taylor v. Director
Pub. Works, 121 Ind. App. 650, 100 N.E.2d 831 (1951); Blair Fork Coal Co. v.
Blankenship, 416 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1967); McClelland v. Hagerty Wrecking Co.,
384 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); King v. Johnson Bros. Constr. Co., 155
N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1967).
47
Workmen's Compensation Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-18-10(1)(b) (1963):
"The burden of proof shall be upon the employee to establish each and every such
fact by competent medical evidence."
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establish proper limits for recovery within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Yet, it certainly was not intended that legitimate claims
should fail merely on the ground that there were no eyewitnesses,
or that those employees who did witness the accident refuse to testify
for fear of losing their own jobs or pensions. It was not anticipated
that the individual's right to compensation would depend upon an
expensive and time consuming skirmish of lawyers and doctors. A
rebuttable presumption in favor of the claimant would be more
equitable to the employee. It would prevent the denial of valid claims
on the basis of embattled principles of common law doctrine applied
by the courts under the guise of legislative intent. At the same time,
it would allow the employer to submit evidence which could justify
a bar to the claimant's recovery. In the final analysis, the Colorado Supreme Court should not allow interpretation of the Workmen's
Compensation Act to work a denial of legitimate claims by employees
injured while performing their work-related duties, simply because
the event which is the cause of the injury is unwitnessed.
G. Landon Feazell, Jr.*
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

EQUAL PROTECTION -

CLASSIFICATION OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE FOR PURPOSES OF RECOVERING
COSTS OF CONFINEMENT. -

State v. Estate of Burnell, 439 P.2d

38 (Colo. 1968).
Having been adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity of the
charge of murder, Arlester L. Burnell was committed to the Colorado
State Hospital's ward for the criminally insane. In subsequent proceedings in the probate court, Burnell was civilly adjudicated a
mental incompetent and an estate was opened. After a period of
time in which funds had accumulated in Burnell's estate, the hospital
filed a claim against the estate for costs of Burnell's care and maintenance, pursuant to a Colorado recovery statute.' The probate court
* The author

wishes to acknowledge the research

and contributions of Mrs. Gladys

Oppenheimer to this Comment.
'Ch. 224, § 1, [19511 Colo. Laws 557, as amended COLO. REv. STAT. ANN §
71-7-1(1) (Supp. 1965). The statute, before the 1964 amendment and relocation,

provided:
Estates liable. - Whenever any person is admitted, committed or transferred
to any public institution of this state, maintained for the care, support, maintenance, education and treatment of insane persons, mentally incompetent persons, criminally insane persons, feeble-minded or epileptic persons, and such
person or persons have real or personal estate or both, the estate of such
person or persons, irrespective of its source, composition or origin, shall be
primarily liable for the payment of the claims of the said public institution for
the care, support, maintenance, education and treatment of said person equal
to the cost per capita per month of care and treatment of other patients in

said institution.

